Abstract. Grouping proof is a technique that proves the co-existence of multiple RFID tags simultaneously in the RFID system. Grouping proof can be used in various applications, such as supply chain management, pharmaceutical distribution. A lot of RFID grouping-proof protocols have been presented by many researchers. However, the previous protocols suffer from the replay attack, and ignore an important issue that the protocol will be stop when one of the tags in the group broke down. We proposed a new protocol which is different from any previous work, because it will be continue to carry out by using time stamp when the tag broke down. Compared with previous protocols, the new protocol has high stability and can count the number of legal tags. Besides, it has good security and blocks replay attack, based on technical analysis.
Introduction
A Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system is a technology of contactless automated identification, which comprises a back-end database, readers and tags attached to goods [1] . RFID system with a group of tags has been widely used, such as supply chain management, pharmaceutical distribution, and so on. To ensure the existence of tags simultaneously, researchers proposed a variety of protocols. Juels introduced a protocol called "Yoking-Proofs" to prove a simultaneous existence of a pair of RFID tags [2] . However, it is vulnerable to replay attack [3, 5] . To improve it, Saito and Sakurai proposed a new protocol by using time stamp [3] . Then Bolotnyy and Robins proposed "Group Yoking Protocol" based on Juels scheme [4] . Cho and Yeo presented "Enhanced Yoking Proof Protocol" and said that it makes replay attack difficult [5] . And then an improved proof for RFID tags has been proposed which requires the reader legality should be authenticated [6] [7] .
Recently several RFID grouping proof protocols have been proposed [8] [9] [10] [11] . However, most of the previous protocols are vulnerable to replay attack. Meanwhile, they ignore an important issue that the protocol will be stop when one of the tags in the group broke down. These two problems are major issues which we should solve first. So, we propose a high stability grouping-proof protocol for RFID tags.
Related Work
In this section, we describe the typical protocols for simultaneous presence of Tags. Then, a brief discussion about security and reliability has been shown.
Notations:  TA, TB: RFID Tag A and Tag B  rA, rB, r: random data  TS: time stamp  xA, xB, xR: privacy data of TA, TB, and reader  MACx(m): MAC applying a privacy data x to message m  PAB: proof for verification that TA and TB simultaneously scanned
Yoking Proof
Ari Juels proposed "yoking-proof" to prove existence of two RFID tags simultaneously [2] . In the protocol, TA and TB share their privacy data xA and xB with the verifier. The left tag TA sends a random data rA to the reader when receiving left proof. and sends the value to the reader. The reader sends mA and mB to the verifier. The protocol has been shown in Figure 1 .
However, due to each tag doesn't validate the legality of receiving data and the verifier doesn't check the reader identity, the protocol is vulnerable to replay attack.
Yoking Proof with Time Stamp
As "yoking proof" is weak at replay attack. Saito and Sakurai proposed a new scheme using time stamp [3] . The protocol process as follows: A reader broadcasts a time stamp (TS) which from database to wake up TA and TB. TA calculates Figure 2 describes the protocol. As TS is transmitted on insecure channel, the attacker can acquire its value by eavesdropping. So, the attacker transmits several different time stamps which are in the effective range of TS to TA. Then, the attacker acquires different combinations (TS, mA), and sends these to the verifier. The verifier can prove these two tags have been read simultaneously even TA is not present.
The Group Yoking Protocol
Bolotnyy and Robins presented a protocol called "Group Yoking Protocol" that ensures a group of tags is read simultaneously [4] . In the protocol, each tag has its own privacy data (xi, ci) which share with the verifier. The reader queries tags in an order 1 2 , ,... (1, 2..., , , ,..., , )
to the verifier. The protocol requires tags communicate each other directly. That is to say, Ti+1 computation are based on the data transmitted from Ti. The reliability may be poor. Meanwhile, the verifier doesn't validate reader identity.
Enhanced Yoking Proof Protocol
Cho and Yeo proposed a protocol which called "Enhanced Yoking Proof Protocol" [5] . The design of the scheme is that the reader sends r1 to TA. Then TA generates rA and transmits it to reader. The reader transmits rA and r2 to TB. TB computes Then, the protocol extends to verify that n tags have been scanned simultaneously.
An Improved Proof
Based on the previous paper, an improved proof for RFID tags has been proposed [6] [7] , as illustrated in Figure 3 . The protocol begins when the reader receives a random data r from the server. The reader queries "Hello" to TA and TB. TA and TB transmit rA and rB to the reader. Then, the reader computes T A B r r r r    , sends it to TA and TB. TA computes and transmits to the verifier. However, as the reader communicates data rT, rA, rB with tags via wireless, the attacker can acquire secret data r and attack the RFID system.
Other Grouping Proof Protocols
Wen-Tsai Ko et al. proposed a secure privacy-preserving RFID grouping proof protocol for inpatient medication safety which was based on ECC. However, it still had some deficiencies, such as replay attack [8] [9] . Then, S. Dhal and I. S. Gupta proposed a new authentication protocol in multi-tag arrangement [10] [11] , but they ignore an important issue that the protocol will be stop when one of the tags in the group broke down. 
A High Stability Grouping-Proof Protocol
Recently, various protocols have been proposed to ensure the existence of group tags simultaneously. However, they are vulnerable to replay attack and have low stability. They do not show the method to deal with the problem that one of the tags in the group broke down. Besides, the previous protocol can not count the number of legal tags in the group.
Informal Description
We assume that an RFID system contains a number of RFID tags. And some symbols are shown in table 1. The initial settings of system are as follows: ⑴ Each tag is embedded identity number IDi and grouping identifier m. Besides, each tag has the ability of calculating hash function and XOR.
⑵ Reader can count the number of tags. It can also calculate the value of hash function and XOR. ⑶ DB owns each tag identify IDi and grouping identifier m. It communicates with the reader through secure channel. Figure 4 . A high stability grouping-proof protocol.
Protocol Description
The process of protocol is shown in Figure 4 . The detail of our protocol is described as below.
Step 1: Reader generates fresh random time stamp values t and t0, calculates h(m), t m, t0 m.
Then it broadcasts them. At the same time, it starts counter.
Step 2: While receiving the information, each tag does the following:
Step
2a: Each tag calculates h(m′) using its own data m', and checks whether received h(m) is legal. And then Ti which in the group acquires time stamp values t and t0 by the logic of XOR.
Step 2b: Each tag sets time stamp. Like this, Ti sets time stamp ti = t+(i-1)×t0. Meanwhile, Reader sets the initial time stamp t. In order to time synchronization with tags, time stamp value of Reader increases by time step t0.
Step 3: T1 calculates hash function h(ID1, m). When T1 time is up, it sends the hash value to Reader.
Step 4: Reader does the following:
Step 4a: While receiving h(ID1, m), Reader forwards this certification information to DB. Then it carries out Step 5.
Step 4b: If Reader does not receive h(ID1, m), it wait for the subsequent tags information at the moment of t+(i-1)×t0, 2≤i≤n.
Step 5: While receiving the information from Reader, DB firstly calculates h(ID1′, m′) using its own data, and then it judges whether h(ID1′, m′) is equal to h(ID1, m). If so, DB sends true to Reader. Otherwise, it sends false.
Step 6: While receiving true from DB, Reader calculates counter=counter+1. If Reader receiving false, it calculates counter=counter+0.
Step 7: Repeat from Step 3 to Step 6 on the other tags.
Design Explanation Time Synchronization between the Reader and the Tag
Before carrying out Step 1, the reader can acquire the important information, including dissemination time of data between the reader and the database, propagation delay between the reader and the tag, and time of data processing. When each tag sets their time stamp, Reader can set the same time to guarantee time synchronization.
How to Select Time Stamp Value?
Firstly, in the case that several tags are in the reading zone, the reader should verify them in a very short time. Secondly time stamp value selected by Reader is not only should be small, but also it can satisfy the practical application. In the protocol, t of a small enough is selected. And t0 is slightly larger than the channel propagation delay.
Protocol Analysis Security
In this section, comparing with the previous work, the theoretical analysis of this protocol has been displayed. We can see that the new protocol shows a satisfactory security.
Data Confidentiality. We always consider the channel between the reader and the database is secure. The channel between the reader and tags is insecure. The information transmitted over an insecure channel is hidden by the hash function and the logic of XOR. The attacker can never get the information of h(m) and h(IDi, m) back into plaintext. The attacker does not acquire plaintext of t and t0. So the proposed protocol has good data confidentiality.
Eavesdropping. When the protocol is carried out, the attacker can record the whole messages transmitted between the reader and tags. The whole information which transmitted over an insecure channel includes h(m), t m, t0 m, h(IDi, m) . Since the one-way features of hash function, the attacker can not pass the correct authentication.
Tracking Attack. In RFID system, the tag who is queried responses to the reader. When the attacker counterfeits the reader, it queries the tag constant. As the result, the location of this tag must be tracked by the attacker. In the protocol, the tag cannot response anyone unless the setting time is finish. Hence, the attacker can not acquire the location of the tag. The proposed protocol can deal with tracking attack.
Tagging Attack. When the attacker counterfeits the legal reader, it queries the tag. The information of the tag may be transmitted to the attacker. In the protocol, the attacker firstly broadcasts the information of h(m), t m, t0 m to tags. Since the attacker does not have data m, it can not acquire t and t0. The attacker does not know when the information will be transmitted. So the protocol makes the tagging attack difficult.
Replay Attack. As the information transmitted from the reader and tags does not be checked, the typical protocols are vulnerable to replay attack. However, this protocol can deal with the problem. Generally, in an RFID system, replay attack includes reader attack and tag attack [12] [13] . The former is that an attacker disguises the reader and replays the query to the tag. The latter is that an attacker disguises the tag and then replays the response to the reader.
We assume that an attacker wants to acquire legal identity by replay attack. And an attacker will do steps as follows.
A1: The attacker receives the information of h(m), t m, t0 m by eavesdropping and broadcasts it.
A2: The attacker then receives h(IDi, m) which transmitted from tag Ti. As the one-way features of hash function, the attacker does not know IDi and m. The attacker records h(IDi, m) and puts out a interrupt signal to Ti.
A3: The attacker transmits h(IDi, m) to the reader in later some time. A4: Due to the sending time too late, the reader judges that this sender must be the attacker. So the attacker can not acquire the legal identity, and the proposed protocol can block replay attack.
Stability Analysis
Stability. The previous protocols ignore an important issue. That is, when one of the tags in the group is broke down, the protocol is terminated. In practical application, an RFID system contains a database, a reader and tags. The reader communicates with the tag which is in the reading zone. And the reader can carry out the protocol when one of the tags is broke down.
In our protocol, the reader generates fresh random time values t and t0, calculates h(m), t m, t0 m. Then it broadcasts them. While receiving the information, each tag checks the information and sets time. At this time, the reader sets the initial time t, and it is timing with tags by the synchronization of a step value t0. The reader receives the information from tags only at the time of t+(i-1)×t0. If Tj is broke down, the reader will not receive the information at the time of t+(j-1)×t0. However, the reader will continue to time and wait for the information of next tag Tj+1 at the time of t+j×t0. So the proposed protocol has good stability.
Tag Counting. At first, we set the initial value of counter is 0. In the protocol, When the reader broadcasts the information of h(m), t m, t0 m, it starts counter. In Step 6, While receiving true from the database, the reader calculates counter=counter+1. That is to say, one of the legal tags in the group is verified successfully. If the reader receiving false, it calculates counter=counter+0. And the tag is not verified by the database. As the protocol has good stability, the reader can easily count the number of the legal tags in the group.
Conclusions
In this paper, a high reliability protocol of grouping proof for multiple tags has been shown. This protocol has a good reliability and copes with replay attack. Since many tags exist in an RFID system, tag collision may be occurred. To solve this problem, the proposed protocol uses a random order query to prevent the collision.
